

PSC 152: Politics in Developing Nations

Summer 2015
Mondays to Thursdays: 1pm to 4pm
Harkness 329

Instructor Information

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Course Description

Why does corruption persist in developing countries-even democratic ones? Does corruption affect the governability of a country? Why and how do political parties in developing nations try to “buy” votes and manipulate elections? We will explore these questions and many others by focusing on both elections and policymaking in developing country democracies, particularly in Latin America and South Asia. Topics will include vote buying, patronage and clientelistic strategies in elections, as well as the role of political parties in getting candidates into office. We will also focus on how legislatures form policies and allocate resources. In addition, we will try to understand how clientelism, electoral manipulation, and corruption influence elections and policy, and why it is so difficult to eradicate these problems.

Course Requirements

Grading Breakdown:

- Class Participation: 25%
- Short Assignments (all in-class): 30%
- Long Assignments (combination of in-class and take-home): 30%
- Final Exam: 15%

Readings

Since this is primarily a seminar course, it is essential that you come to class having done the assigned readings and prepared to engage in discussion. I understand that there is only so much time you have to complete assigned readings given that the class will be meeting every day. Therefore, the Course Schedule section below indicates which readings are to be completed before coming to class. In other words, some articles/chapters will be read in class to help students manage the reading load. Consequently, I *will* expect that you come to class

having spent time on the readings, and I greatly encourage bringing in not only thoughts on the readings but also even questions based on parts of readings that seemed unclear or difficult to understand.

Academic articles are all available online, either directly or through the library's website. Students are not required to purchase any books for this class. Any book chapters that are required reading will be provided by the instructor, either through Blackboard or via email.

Attendance

Attendance is not compulsory but is strongly encouraged given the structure of the course and the grading breakdown. It is almost impossible to achieve a high grade in the class without regular attendance.

Assignments and Exams

There will be a closed book, closed notes final exam on the last day of class, i.e., on June 15, which will be held during regular class hours. There will be no make-up exam, barring serious circumstances beyond a student's control, such as a death in the family or a medical emergency; in such cases, I may ask for supporting documentation to ensure fairness to other students. Details of the structure of the final exam will be discussed with the students early on in the semester.

Assignments are indicated in the Course Schedule below. Any changes will be announced in class well ahead of time to prevent any confusion for students. Since most of these assignments will be started during class, students are asked to bring their laptops (or tablets, if they prefer) to all sessions. However, I will request that these devices not be used during class unless we are specifically working on an in-class assignment. Ordinarily, late assignments will not be accepted and missed assignments cannot be made up. If an unforeseen emergency genuinely hinders the timely completion of an assignment, the student should discuss the reason with the instructor as soon as possible, and we will work out a solution together.

Academic Honesty

While this is a seminar course and I encourage students to discuss assignments and readings with one another, please remember that all written work must be done independently, and all outside sources utilized must be cited clearly. The University has strict Academic Honesty policies (<http://www.rochester.edu/college/honesty/>) which are to be respected. If students are unsure of whether they are using any resource 'fairly', they are welcome to come and discuss their concerns with me before submitting any written work.

Course Schedule (Updated on May 19, 2015)

Note: Readings marked with * are to be completed before coming to class. Please bring the other readings with you to class as well since we will be reading them during class time.

Developing Countries

- **Session 1 (May 18):** Introduction to course; What are "developing nations"?

- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*, New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2 (“The Ends and the Means of Development”; p.35-53).

- **Session 2 (May 19):** Why study the politics of developing nations?

- *Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, Crown Business. Chapter 2 (p.45-69).
- Collier, Paul. 2008. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 5 (“Bad Governance in a Small Country”; p.64-76).
- Documentary: “In Search of Gandhi” from *Why Democracy?* Project.

Government and Electoral Systems

- **Session 3 (May 20):** What are the common systems of government and elections? Why do they matter?

- *Powell Jr., G. Bingham, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaare Strom. 2012. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 10th edition, Pearson. p.84-p.89 and p.102-p.106.
- Simpser, Alberto. 2014. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 (excerpts). *Instructor will bring these to class.*
- In-class assignment: Country Profiles. Instructions will be given in class.

Election Strategies and Manipulation

- **Session 4 (May 21):** Why and how parties try to manipulate elections.

- *Simpser, Alberto. 2014. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (p.1-31).
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2 (“Gaps Between Theory and Fact”; p.31-74).
- In-class assignment on designing a plan for buying votes. Instructions will be given in class.

- Please note that there is **no class on May 25** in lieu of Memorial Day.

Clientelism

- **Session 5 (May 26):** What clientelism is and where it emerges.

- *Stokes, Susan C. 2007. “Political Clientelism” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- *Hicken, Allen. 2011. “Clientelism.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: p.289-310.

- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6 (“Clientelism and Poverty”; p.152-171).
- Vote-buying plans will be discussed in class today.
- **Session 6 (May 27):** Clientelism and patronage in Argentina.
 - *Remmer, Karen L. 2007. “The Political Economy of Patronage: Expenditure Patterns in the Argentine Provinces, 1983-2003.” *Journal of Politics* 69(2): p.363-377.
 - Calvo, Ernesto and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market.” *American Political Science Review* 48(4): p.742-757.
 - In-class assignment on India’s political system. Instructions will be given in class.
- **Session 7 (May 28):** Parties and patronage politics in India.
 - *Wilkinson, Steven I. 2007. “Explaining changing patterns of party-voter linkages in India” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, Cambridge University Press.
 - *Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6 (“India as a Patronage Democracy”).
 - Annotated Bibliography assignment instructions will be given today.

Vote Buying and Electoral Fraud

- **Session 8 (June 01):** Why and how vote-buying has emerged.
 - *Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007. “Why Study Vote Buying?” in Frederic Charles Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Lynne Rienner Pub.
 - *Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2007. “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge?” in Frederic Charles Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Lynne Rienner Pub.
 - Hicken, Allen D. 2007. “How do Rules and Institutions Encourage Vote Buying?” in Frederic Charles Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Lynne Rienner Pub.
 - Annotated Bibliography due today.
- **Session 9 (June 02):** Vote-buying empirical evidence.
 - *Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan C. Stokes. 2004. “Vote buying in Argentina.” *Latin American Research Review* 39(2): p.66-88.
 - *Rueda, Miguel R. 2014. “Election Aggregates and the Choice of Electoral Manipulation Strategies.” *Working Paper*.
 - In-class opinion piece. Instructions will be given in class.

- **Session 10 (June 03):** How does electoral fraud operate and persist?
 - *Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: p.233-256.
 - *Callen, Michael and James D. Long. 2015. “Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan.” *American Economic Review* 105(1): p.354-381.
 - In-class assignment on electoral rigging in Pakistan and Mexico. Instructions will be given in class.

Pork-Barrel Politics

- **Session 11 (June 04):** Pork-Barrel as a form of clientelism.
 - *Ames, Barry. 1995. “Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress.” *The Journal of Politics* 57(2): p.324-343.
 - *Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. *Voting for Autocracy*, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4 (“The Politics of Vote Buying”; p.122-150.)
 - Malik, Rabia. 2015. “Pork in Pakistan? The Politics of Resource Allocation in the Pakistani National Legislature.” *Working Paper*.
 - Instructions for next week’s presentations will be discussed, and students will pick readings to present on.

Corruption

- **Session 12 (June 08):** Forms of corruption and how to measure it empirically.
 - *Olken, Benjamin A. and Rohini Pande. 2012. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” *Annual Review of Economics* 4: p.479-509.
 - *Bertrand, Marianne, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2007. “Obtaining a driver’s license in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* p.1639-1676.
 - *Sukhtankar, Sandip. 2012. “Sweetening the Deal? Political Connections and Sugar Mills in India.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(3): p.43-63.
 - Student presentations on some of the readings for today.
 - In-class assignment on datasets on corruption. Instructions will be given in class.
- **Session 13 (June 09):** Corruption and political outcomes.
 - *Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian. 2005. “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* p.1371-1411.
 - *Olken, Benjamin A. 2007. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia” *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2): p.200-249.
 - Student presentations on some of the readings for today.
 - In-class assignment on designing an experiment/survey to measure corruption.

Policymaking and Outcomes

- **Session 14 (June 10):** Policy choices in developing countries.
 - *Desposato, Scott W. 2007. “How Does Vote Buying Shape the Legislative Arena?” in Frederic Charles Schaffer (ed.) *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, Lynne Rienner Pub.
 - Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” *Econometrica* 72(5): p.1409-1443.
 - *Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): p.804-821.
 - Students will also continue working on their experiments/surveys.

- **Session 15 (June 11):** Public goods provision.
 - *Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2009. “When do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort.” *American Political Science Review* 103(1): p.99-112.
 - *Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Beatriz Magaloni and Alexander Ruiz-Euler. 2014. “Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico.” *World Development* 53: p.80-93.
 - Jack, B. Kelsey and María P. Recalde. 2013. “Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field Evidence from Bolivia.” *Working Paper*.
 - Students will share their experiment/survey design with the rest of the class.

- **Session 16 (June 15):** Final Exam.